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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the role of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the context of 
global value chains. Given the interconnectedness of trade and investment, preferential 
trade agreements not only contribute to participation and value capture by eliminating 
traditional trade barriers, they also provide a framework for economic governance 
regulating behind-the-border policies. While this is an important device for ensuring 
commitment to creating a reliable business environment, deep trade agreements also tend 
to restrict policy autonomy. Governing global value chains by means of deep trade 
agreements is thus a double-edged sword. 
Against this background, developing countries should carefully assess the pros and cons 
associated with PTA membership. In order to successfully reap the benefits, PTAs should 
be geared towards developing country needs by maintaining the flexibility necessary for 
developmental purposes. This will require negotiation skills on the part of developing 
countries as well as technical assistance for implementation on the part of developed 
countries. Moreover, given the increasingly global character of value chains, both 
developed and developing countries should pursue negotiations at the multilateral level in 
order to make optimal use of the opportunities created by global value chain trade. 
By looking at deep PTAs, this paper combines the literature on regional integration with 
the new strand of global value chain research – without neglecting the traditional view on 
global value chains and development which stresses the role for complementary policies. 
The paper concludes by translating the findings into policy recommendations and pointing 
out gaps in the literature that should be addressed to better inform policy-makers. 
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1 Introduction 
The last decade was characterised by both the rising importance of global value chains 
(GVCs) in international trade and the parallel proliferation of preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs). Making a connection between the two phenomena seems paradoxical at 
first, since the global nature of value chains should encourage multilateral rather than 
bilateral or plurilateral negotiations (OECD 2013, 109). However, the strong nexus of 
trade and investment and the complex structure inherent in GVCs presents the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) with a serious institutional challenge and thus – especially in 
light of the slow progress of multilateral negotiations – gives rise to a “demand for new 
forms of governance” (IMF 2013). The rising importance of trade-related dimensions such 
as competition, investment and intellectual property rights, which are not sufficiently 
addressed at the multilateral level from a GVC perspective, reveals the lack of institutions, 
regulations and mechanisms to deal with such ‘behind-the-border’ issues. PTAs seem to 
be partly closing this gap in economic governance by including disciplines and 
commitments that go substantially further than the trade rules of the WTO. 
For developing countries, the implications of deep PTAs in the context of GVCs are of 
particular interest. On the one hand, PTAs eliminate trade barriers and serve as a 
commitment device signalling policy transparency and predictability – both of which are 
associated with increased foreign direct investment and trading activity. On the other 
hand, the binding commitments in PTAs are often regarded as restricting policy-makers in 
their choice of supportive policies for development. If PTAs are indeed seen as a 
necessary way of governing global value chains, assessment of their impact on 
participation and value capture is essential. 
During recent decades, opportunities for developing countries to participate in 
international trade have increased significantly. The fragmentation of production proces-
ses along the value chain, or ‘vertical specialisation’, has led to trade in final goods being 
increasingly substituted by “trade in tasks” (Grossman / Rossi-Hansberg 2008). 
Consequently, in order to become integrated into world trade, countries no longer need to 
be competitive in the production of final goods, but rather in certain tasks involved in the 
production process. This allows developing countries to industrialise by joining value 
chains, instead of building whole chains by themselves (Baldwin 2011). GVCs are said to 
play a “catalytic role for development” (UNCTAD 2013a) by providing access to net-
works, markets, capital, knowledge and technology (OECD 2013). Empirical analyses by 
the IMF (2013) show indeed that GVC participation is positively correlated with 
productivity gains and growth.  
However, what ultimately matters is not only participation in GVCs, but the extent of value 
created in the export-related economy that effectively contributes to domestic job creation 
and growth (Banga 2014). Concerns are voiced that the share of domestic value added in 
exports is often limited in developing countries that specialise and remain trapped in low 
segments of the value chain or that rely on high proportions of imported content (UNCTAD 
2013d). Eventually, productivity growth stemming predominantly from the narrowing of the 
technology gap between host and source country will slow down and domestic wages will 
adjust, eroding a country’s comparative advantage. Hence, developing countries risk being 
caught in a “middle-income trap” or “imitation trap” (Agenor / Canuto 2012). 
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A country aiming at both increasing its participation in GVCs and improving its position 
in them will have to go beyond traditional trade policy. It must also address behind-the-
border barriers that affect its attractiveness as a part of these chains. The emergence of 
GVCs and the consequent need for reforming behind-the-border regulations have 
therefore certainly contributed to the recent proliferation of deep PTAs. In many cases, 
PTA provisions go much further than the multilateral WTO rules in regulating not only 
trade between member states but also areas such as investment, industrial standards, 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, labour standards and environmental 
protection (Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir 2010). 
The proliferation of deep PTAs brings opportunities as well as risks. On the one hand, 
PTAs take account of the growing importance of regional and global production networks 
and encourage further integration by eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment. Moreover, developing countries may benefit from a more stable and reliable 
trade and investment environment promoted through deep PTAs, which is necessary for 
upgrading along the value chain towards higher value-added tasks. On the other hand, the 
extensive coverage of behind-the-border regulations, affecting far more policy areas than 
just directly trade-related issues, can tie governments’ hands when they are trying to 
pursue a national development strategy. For example, some PTAs include provisions on 
dispute settlement mechanisms that grant foreign investors the right to sue states before an 
international arbitration court and to demand significant compensation. 
Making use of newly available data on decomposed trade flows and on the content of PTAs, 
this paper investigates the link between global value chains and preferential trade 
agreements. By assessing the trade-offs between deep integration and developmental space 
in relation to PTAs, it contributes to the literature by shedding light on what Dalle / Fossati / 
Lavopa (2013) call “the missing piece in the GVC debate”. The remainder of this paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the measurement, concepts and 
indicators of value-added trade and presents some stylised facts with a particular focus on 
the role of developing countries in global value chains. Section 3 evaluates the role of 
preferential trade agreements in a global value chain context. Section 4 highlights the trade-
offs associated with deep PTA provisions. Section 5 derives policy recommendations from 
the preceding analysis and identifies research gaps. Section 6 then outlines areas of future 
research. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Trading value added: measurement and stylised facts 
The importance of trade in parts and components relative to that of trade in final goods has 
been rising steadily – trade in intermediates now accounts for almost two-thirds of world 
trade (IMF 2013).This implies that a significant amount of goods crosses borders more 
than once. UNCTAD (2013d) estimates that in 2010, five trillion USD, representing more 
than 25% of global gross exports, was double-counted. In a world of global value chains, 
gross exports are therefore no longer sufficient for studying trade patterns as they mask the 
underlying structure and overstate export performance through multiple counting in the 
official statistics. Traditional trade statistics remain relevant as they describe the physical 
movement of goods across borders, but “the concept of ‘value added’ is useful in order to 
understand where economic activity and jobs are generated” (Miroudot / Yamano 2013). 
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Mattoo / Whang / Wei (2013) emphasise that the decomposition of gross trade into value-
added measures can provide important insights regarding the implications of trade policy, 
global imbalances, exchange rate assessments, competitiveness and environmental issues. 
This chapter gives an introduction to the measurement, concepts and indicators of trade in 
value added and provides some stylised facts about the role of developing countries in 
different dimensions of global value chains. 
2.1 Measurement, concepts and indicators 
With the rising importance of global value chain trade, scholars as well as policy-makers 
have acknowledged the need for more disaggregated trade data. Various initiatives have 
thus put enormous effort into disentangling the complex structure of trade. For the time 
being, the most widely used database is probably the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD) constructed jointly by 11 research institutions led by the University of Tinbergen. 
Timmer (2012) provides a comprehensive overview of WIOD’s contents, sources and 
methods for obtaining workable data. In a joint effort, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the WTO launched their Trade in Value Added 
(TiVA) database in January 2013, making value-added trade data readily accessible. In the 
meantime, UNCTAD is working on a GVC database that includes more developing 
countries than are covered by WIOD and TiVA. Further initiatives providing decomposed 
trade flows include the Global Trade Analysis (GTAP) project and the Asian International 
input-output tables generated by the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO). 
The different databases vary considerably with regard to countries, sectors and years 
covered. Most notably, while one approach is to deal with a small number of countries but 
many time periods (WIOD), another is to cover fewer different time periods but for more 
countries (OECD/WTO TiVA). Data availability is a major challenge in this regard. 
Compromising statistical rigour by using interpolation and estimation methods, the 
UNCTAD-Eora GVC database1 is now attempting to make available a continuous dataset 
from 1990 to 2010 for more than 100 countries, including many developing countries.2 
In order to construct indicators for trade in value added, the underlying structure of trade 
flows is evaluated. Accordingly, one needs to track products and services along the value 
chain within and between sectors and countries. As many products cross borders multiple 
times before reaching the final consumer, tracking these value chains is no trivial task. 
Moreover, trade statistics are rarely consistent across countries, so harmonisation is 
needed in order to construct a global inter-country input-output table. Obtaining a globally 
consistent database on gross and value-added trade flows therefore entails making 
assumptions, approximations and estimations.3 Against this background, it is important to 
                                                 
1 The value-added trade data in UNCTAD’s GVC database are derived from the Eora multi-region input-
output (MRIO) tables. 
2 For a more detailed overview of the existing databases see UNCTAD’s 2013 World Investment Report, 
chapter 4, p. 124. 
3 For a more detailed description of the steps to constructing value-added trade data, please refer to 
Timmer (2012) for WIOD and Miroudot / de Backer (2013) for OECD/WTO-TiVA. 
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keep in mind that measurement errors are difficult to avoid. Nevertheless, value-added 
trade data are much more informative in many respects than data on gross trade flows. 
In the following paragraphs, the most important concepts and indicators for measuring 
different aspects of participation in global value chains will be introduced. The list is non-
exhaustive, but sufficient for following the remainder of this paper.4 In general, gross 
exports (EX) can be broken down into two components – domestic value added (DVA) 
and foreign value added (FVA). The relationship can thus simply be described by 
ܧܺ ൌ ܦܸܣ ൅ ܨܸܣ. 
Domestic value added is the content embodied in exports that directly contributes to 
value creation in the economy and thus to GDP. It is equal to the payments to the factors 
of production. Foreign value added is foreign content embodied in exports, i.e. raw 
materials or intermediate goods imported from partner countries for further exporting. 
Hummels / Ishii / Yi (2001) use FVA as an indicator for vertical specialisation, as it 
captures the extent of usage of foreign imported intermediates and proxies the integration 
into global production networks. Other indicators of interest are the share of domestic and 
foreign content in gross exports (i.e. DVA/EX and FVA/EX), because they measure to 
what extent domestic (or foreign) value added contributes to the total value of exports. 
It is possible that not all the domestic content embodied in exports is absorbed by 
consumers in the importing partner country. Parts of domestic value added may travel 
further to third countries or return to the home country, being embodied in the exports of 
the partner country. The domestic value added embodied in third countries’ exports 
(DVA3) is thus a subset of total domestic value added and crosses borders at least twice. 
On the basis of the given concepts, Koopman et al. (2010) derive an indicator for global 
value chain participation: a country is well integrated into global production networks if it 
sources many inputs from abroad (downstream participation) and a large proportion of its 
own value added is part of third countries’ exports (upstream participation), relative to its 
total exports, i.e. 
ܩܸܥ݌ܽݎݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܨܸܣ ൅ ܦܸܣ͵ܧܺ ൌ 
ܨܸܣ
ܧܺ ൅
ܦܸܣ͵
ܧܺ Ǥ 
The first component in the formula captures downstream participation and the second term 
upstream participation. Note that this definition of GVC participation extends the indicator 
for vertical specialisation introduced by Hummels / Ishii / Yi (2001) by the upstream 
component and is thus a more complete measure of participation in global value chains. 
Johnson / Noguera (2012) propose an indicator for value-added exports (VA) which is 
defined as domestic value added embodied in foreign final demand. It captures the 
domestic value added reaching its final destination, i.e. the link to the end consumer. The 
                                                 
4 For a detailed breakdown of gross exports in a unified accounting framework, please refer to Koopman / 
Wang / Wei (2014) who decompose gross exports into nine ‘buckets’ subsumed under three main pillars 
– value-added exports, domestic content in intermediate exports that finally return home, and foreign 
content. 
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value added may well travel through additional production stages before reaching its 
destination. Hence, this measure differs conceptually from domestic value-added em-
bodied in exports (DVA) which simply singles out the domestic content in direct exports 
and ignores the journey of value added across further borders. Value-added exports are 
thus further away from real trade flows: “Value added is not directly traded: value-added 
exports are the result of how goods trade flows are combined and used across countries 
through the global input-output structure” (Noguera 2012). 
For clarification, Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between gross exports, domestic 
value added embodied in exports and domestic value added embodied in foreign final 
demand (‘value-added exports’). Special attention should be given to the fact that 
domestic content embodied in exports is always a fraction of gross exports, while value-
added exports can be positive even when no direct trade relationship exists. An example is 
the relationship between A and C in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Explaining the concepts of gross and value-added trade 
 
Scenario: 
Country A exports cocoa beans worth 100 USD to country B. Country B uses the cocoa beans to
produce chocolate worth 180 USD which is then exported to country C. Consumers in country B do
not like chocolate, so the whole produce is exported.
What do the gross and value added trade flows look like?
B
C0A
B
C0A
B
C100A
EX
Gross exports
DVA
Domestic value added
embodied in exports
VA
Domestic value added
embodied in foreign final 
demand
(„exports of value added“)
A Æ B 100 100 0
B Æ C 180 80 80
A Æ C 0 0 100
 
Source: Author 
On the basis of their definition of value-added exports, Johnson / Noguera (2012) define 
the VAX ratio as an additional indicator for the study of GVCs. VAX is the ratio of value-
added exports over total exports given as 
ܸܣܺ ൌ ܸܣܧܺǤ 
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The VAX ratio can be interpreted as an alternative measure for the intensity of production-
sharing or the domestic content of exports. A higher VAX ratio may also mean successful 
upgrading to higher value-added tasks or chains. 
2.2 Facts and figures 
Having introduced measures and indicators for trade in value added, this subsection will 
summarise the main findings of the GVC literature and illustrate some important patterns 
graphically – with a focus on participation and value capture by developing countries. 
In general, over the past decades, non-OECD countries have increased both participation 
and value capture in global value chains. Figure 2 shows how the share of value-added trade 
of non-OECD countries relative to the world total increased from 21% in 1990 to 30.2% in 
2010.5 This is significant, as value-added trade makes up an important part of developing 
countries’ GDP: 28% compared with 18% in developed countries in 2010 (UNCTAD 
2013b). Using the OECD/WTO TiVA data, Banga (2014) estimates that of total value 
generated under GVCs, OECD countries contribute 67%, the BRICs and newly 
industrialised countries6 25%, and the remaining developing economies and least-developed 
countries (LDCs) only 8%. In sum, OECD countries still contribute the lion’s share and the 
increase in non-OECD shares can to a large extent be traced back to emerging economies. 
Figure 2: OECD and non-OECD shares of world trade in value addeda) 
 
 
Note: a) OECD in both pie charts comprises the 34 member countries of the OECD as of April 2014. 
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC database 
                                                 
5 Value-added trade is here measured as the domestic value added embodied in exports, i.e. DVA. 
6 BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Newly industrialised countries (as classified by Banga 2014): 
Chinese Taipei, Korea, Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Brunei Darussalam. 
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Both GVC participation and value capture are important targets for developing countries. 
While GVC participation and exports of value added are highly correlated (IMF 2013), 
increasing the share of domestic content in exports to augment value capture while 
increasing GVC participation still seems difficult. A country liberalising its trade and 
investment regime in order to encourage participation in GVCs will almost always 
experience an inflow of foreign intermediates, which increases the share of foreign content 
share in exports. Upgrading to higher value-added tasks is not automatic. Hence, there is a 
short-term trade-off between GVC participation and increasing the share of domestic 
content in exports (UNCTAD 2013d). Most developing countries follow this path, but still 
experience a positive contribution to GDP of their integration in GVCs (UNCTAD 
2013d). 
UNCTAD (2013d) shows that countries with higher growth in GVC participation achieve 
higher economic growth rates on average. The same is true for countries with higher growth in 
domestic content’s share in exports. The most successful countries with regard to growth 
performance are characterised by high growth both in GVC participation and in domestic 
content’s share in exports, e.g. China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
2.2.1 Participation in GVCs 
Participation in GVCs is a promising means for developing countries to become integrated 
into the international trading system. Because of the associated opportunities for economic 
development, it has become an important part of export-led growth strategies in many 
developing countries, particularly South East Asia (UNCTAD 2013a).  
The existing literature has started to identify determinants that facilitate or hinder partici-
pation in GVCs. Owing to the strong nexus of trade and investment and the important role 
of transnational corporations in shaping global value chains, a strong driver of GVC 
participation is foreign direct investment (IMF 2013). Consequently, a more conducive 
business environment – as measured by the World Doing Business Index – is associated 
with higher GVC participation (UNCTAD 2013a). In general, lower trade costs facilitate 
integration into GVCs. Using a theoretical model, Grossman / Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
show that improvements in communications technology – through lowering trade costs – 
result in a more globalised production process. 
Moreover, small countries tend to be more integrated into GVCs because of their greater need 
for foreign inputs (downstream participation). The relationship is diluted, however, by the fact 
that large countries tend to supply many inputs used in third countries’ exports (upstream 
participation), which also feeds into the participation index (Backer / Miroudot 2013). 
Countries excluded from GVCs often share characteristics such as remoteness and lack of 
natural resources as well as a deficient infrastructure and business environment (OECD 
2013, 10). Moreover, where intellectual property and investment rights are weak, foreign 
firms’ know-how and capital are more exposed, reducing the incentive to locate parts of 
their supply chain in the country concerned (IMF 2013). 
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Figure 3 illustrates GVC participation by income category for the years 1990 and 2010.7 
Following the definition by Koopman et al. (2010) introduced in Section 2.1, GVC 
participation is measured by the extent of foreign inputs used in exports (downstream 
component) and the domestic value added used in third countries’ exports (upstream 
component).8 First, it is noteworthy that all income groups have experienced a strong 
increase in overall GVC participation in the last two decades. Second, the degree of GVC 
participation seems to be positively correlated with income. High-income countries are 
best integrated into global value chains, while low-income countries lag behind – although 
they are catching up. 
Third, the graph allows conclusions to be drawn about the type of GVC participation. 
Downstream participation measures the extent to which foreign inputs are embodied in 
exports (FVA/EX). Upstream participation indicates the share of domestic inputs used in 
third countries’ exports relative to total exports (DVA3/EX). Note that most of the growth 
in GVC participation in low-income countries stems from upstream participation, 
presumably from increased exports of natural resources and raw materials. Upstream 
participation and providing core inputs for production is a good thing in general, but the 
low growth in downstream participation indicates that many low-income countries still 
struggle to gain access to GVCs beyond their initial starting point (UNCTAD 2013d). 
Figure 3: GVC participation by income category 
 
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC database 
Moreover, many developing countries’ participation in GVCs is limited to supplying 
developed countries’ markets – East and South East Asia, where South–South networks 
                                                 
7 The most recent World Bank classification, 2014, is used for Figures 3 and 4. Please refer to the 
Appendix for a list of countries included in each income group. 
8 The downstream component therefore measures the extent to which a country A uses B’s intermediate 
products in its exports. The upstream components measures how much of A’s exports to B is used as an 
intermediate input for B’s exports to C. 
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are gaining increasing importance, being an exception (UNCTAD 2013a). Baldwin / 
Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) capture this asymmetry by distinguishing between “factory 
economies” and “headquarter economies”. Another concern is that GVC participation, 
often limited to the low value-added segments and involving a high proportion of foreign 
content, does not contribute sufficiently to local value capture and income-generation 
(UNCTAD 2013d). Besides GVC participation, it is therefore also relevant to further 
assess which position countries occupy in GVCs and how much value they capture from 
their trading activities. 
2.2.2 Value capture in GVCs 
Value capture can be measured either by the share of domestic content in gross exports 
(DVA/EX) or by the ratio of value-added exports to total exports (VAX ratio). From a 
global perspective, the VAX ratio declined by approximately ten percentage points 
between 1970 and 2010, and the rate of decline accelerated over time (Johnson / Noguera 
2012). This illustrates the extent of production-sharing, with many products crossing 
borders multiple times. However, there is significant heterogeneity across countries and 
sectors. Two general patterns emerge: 
1) Position in the value chain 
The VAX ratio tends to be low for countries participating in the assembly part of 
GVCs and high for countries providing ‘core’ inputs of final products (IMF 2013). 
This includes raw materials and “intangible or knowledge based assets” that are hard 
to imitate or reproduce, such as research and design (OECD 2013, 217). 
2) Export composition 
The VAX ratio is high for agriculture, natural resources and services, but low for the 
manufacturing sector (Johnson / Noguera 2012). If a large share of a country’s exports 
is attributable to only one sector, this has repercussions on the country’s aggregate 
VAX ratio. 
It thus seems that a country’s composition of exports and its specific task and position in 
the value chain – rather than the level of income – predict its aggregate VAX ratio and/or 
the share of domestic content in exports. For example, developed countries often have a 
large manufacturing share in their exports, which tends to reduce their VAX ratio. 
Nevertheless, they occupy higher value-added segments within the manufacturing sector, 
which tends to increase their VAX ratio (Johnson / Noguera 2012). 
Figure 4 illustrates the share of domestic content in exports (DVA/EX) by income 
category. First, the domestic content share has decreased over time in all income groups. 
This is due to the above argument that rising GVC participation increases production-
sharing and the use of foreign content in exports. Second, it seems that low-income 
countries have the largest domestic content share in their exports. 
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Figure 4: Domestic content share in exports by income category 
 
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC database 
There are two possible explanations for the relatively large share of domestic content in 
low-income countries’ exports: (i) the small share that domestic content accounts for in 
high-income countries’ exports may stem from the fact that this income category is to a 
large extent made up of EU countries with an above-average level of production-sharing, 
i.e. an extremely high amount of border crossings of intermediate inputs and foreign 
content in exports; (ii) the results may be driven by the fact that low-income countries are 
often exporters of natural resources and raw materials (pattern 2) and are not necessarily 
an indication of developing countries occupying higher value-added positions in the value 
chain (pattern 1). 
Lead firms are often reluctant to outsource core competencies, aiming to keep control over 
high value-added segments of their supply chain (UNCTAD 2013a). Especially for 
knowledge-intensive products, the reliability of suppliers is very important. As a supply chain 
is only as strong as its weakest component, many developing countries are locked in low-
value-added segments with shorter and less technology-intensive chains (UNCTAD 2013a). 
The position that a country needs to occupy in order to capture value may differ across 
industries and value chains (OECD 2013), making it a difficult target for policy-makers in 
developing countries. There is consensus, however, that some factors contribute to the capture 
and upgrading of value along the chain, such as a favourable business climate, sound behind-
the-border policies, infrastructure, education and training, protection of intellectual property 
rights, quality control, and contract enforcement (OECD 2013, 10 ; Dean 2013). 
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3 Evaluating the role of PTAs: deep provisions for global value chain trade 
On the basis of the findings described in Chapter 2, Section 3.1 outlines the general 
implications of tariff and non-tariff barriers in GVCs, highlighting the important 
contribution of PTAs to developing country participation and value capture. Section 3.2 
then looks at the most common deep PTA provisions in detail. Finally, Section 3.3 
reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship between preferential trade agreements, 
trade and investment, with a particular focus on GVCs. 
3.1 Implications of tariff and non-tariff barriers in GVCs 
In a world of global value chains, traditional trade policy has to be thoroughly reassessed. 
Since goods cross borders multiple times, even small tariffs can add up to significant trade 
cost. This magnification effect is reinforced by the fact that tariffs are applied to gross 
imports, not only to their value-added part, meaning that the direct exporter may be taxed 
for parts that it has not produced itself. Koopman et al. (2010) state that especially 
developing countries tend to be harmed by the magnification effect, because in these 
countries tariffs on intermediate imports are higher on average than in developed 
countries. This is particularly true for many Asian countries which typically also have a 
high share of foreign content in their exports. 
Tariff barriers not only become more expensive, they also become more harmful in that 
they jeopardise the domestic comparative advantage. Whether a firm is competitive 
enough to export hinges to a significant extent on its ability to source inputs cheaply 
(OECD 2013, 150). With trade in final goods, tariffs harm consumers by increasing prices 
but protect domestic producers. In a GVC setting, producers are also negatively affected 
since tariffs erode their competitiveness. Hence, tariffs are no longer just ‘beggar-your-
neighbour’ but ‘beggar thyself’ policies (Miroudot / Yamano 2013). The ‘thicker’ that 
national borders are, the more complicated and costly the international sourcing of inputs 
(OECD 2013, 41). 
The IMF (2013) shows empirically that the overall trade restrictiveness of a country is 
negatively related to value-added exports. In light of the above issues, GVCs could be 
seen as a “new argument for trade liberalization” (OECD 2013, 88). Indeed, recent 
research highlights the role of production fragmentation on limiting the use of tariffs on 
parts and components as well as other protectionist measures (IMF 2013). Baldwin / 
Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) show a sharp drop in applied tariffs (especially on intermediates) 
in developing countries since the 1990s, which can be interpreted as a unilateral effort to 
facilitate integration into global value chains. 
Non-tariff barriers are equally harmful for participation in GVCs. In fact, estimates 
suggest that the trade gains from smoother border procedures are higher than those from 
tariff reductions (UNCTAD 2013d). The negative consequences of costly and lengthy 
customs procedures at every border crossing is rendered even greater by the magnification 
effect. The trade facilitation package agreed on in Bali in December 2013 is therefore of 
great importance to the integration of developing countries in global value chains. 
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Besides ‘thick’ borders, behind-the-border policies can also have a significant impact on 
GVC participation. Whether a country is included in a firm’s supply chain often depends 
on a trade-off between direct and indirect costs. In many cases, the “ability to move goods 
continuously, safely and economically” is a more decisive factor than labour costs 
(UNCTAD 2013a). In that sense, the institutional framework is of utmost importance for 
attracting investments. UNCTAD (2013a) estimates that an improvement in government 
effectiveness in low-income countries to the level of that in middle-income countries 
would increase exports of intermediates by almost 50%. To give an example, the 
enforcement of contracts and intellectual property rights plays a crucial role, especially 
when products are characterised by a large share of research and development (R&D) or 
intellectual property involved in their content (Dean 2013). Although research and design 
tasks are usually not carried out in developing countries, the mere fact that knowledge-
intensive products may be shipped for assembly to countries with a weak regulatory 
framework may invoke the need for additional regulations. 
Given the strong nexus of trade and investment in global value chains, whether a country 
is included in GVCs hinges not only on trade policy, but also on the regulations regarding 
foreign direct investment. Most of global value chain trade is generated through 
transnational corporations (UNCTAD 2013d). Providing a sound business environment 
and removing barriers for foreign firms can therefore represent strong incentives. More-
over, many investments and contractual relationships are long-term, making government 
transparency and policy reliability important factors. 
In sum, the importance of global value chains implies that tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade matter a great deal – especially for integrating developing countries into the chains. 
According to Baldwin (2012), “protectionism is destructionism as far as developing 
nations are concerned”. Traditional trade policies can backfire by undermining 
comparative advantages. Moreover, the interdependence of trade and investments makes 
dimensions such as the institutional quality, government transparency, the investment 
framework, intellectual property rights and contract enforcement more important. One 
means of addressing tariffs as well as behind-the-border issues underpinning global value 
chain trade is the signing of deep preferential trade agreements. 
3.2 The proliferation of deep provisions in trade agreements 
Many preferential trade agreements concluded in the past decade differ from their 
predecessors in two dimensions. 
Horizontal dimension: Recent PTAs tend to have a larger scope in that they include topics 
beyond directly trade-related issues. Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2010) refer to these types of 
provisions as WTO-X dimensions, as previously they were only negotiated outside the 
WTO. Examples of WTO-X dimensions include investment, competition, environment, 
health, human rights, etc. 
Vertical dimension: In addition to the horizontal dimension, many PTAs demand much 
larger commitments in the ‘traditional’ provisions – often beyond what was negotiated at 
the multilateral level. Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2010) refer to these provisions, which do 
appear in multilateral agreements but tend to be much stronger in PTAs, as WTO+ 
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provisions. Trade-related investment measures, trade-related intellectual property rights, 
services, public procurement and anti-dumping are examples of WTO+ provisions.9 
Figure 5 draws on the depth indicator from a new database on the design of trade 
agreements introduced by Dür / Baccini / Elsig (2014) covering roughly 600 PTAs con-
cluded between 1948 and 2009. It ranges from 0 to 7 and measures whether a substantive 
provision in the following areas is included in the trade agreement: elimination of tariffs, 
services trade, investments, standards, public procurement, competition and intellectual 
property rights. A deep agreement covers many of these areas in a substantive way, while 
a shallow one mentions them only briefly or not at all. 
A glance at Figure 5 reveals the fact that preferential trade agreements have become 
deeper over time. This trend is especially striking from 1990 onwards. The spike at 1957 
can be explained by the foundation of the European Community, which at that time 
covered a comparatively large number of areas in a substantive way. 
Figure 5: Average depth of trade agreements (concluded 1948-2009) 
 
 
Source: DESTA database 
Furthermore, agreements between developed and developing countries (referred to as 
‘North–South’ for convenience) are substantially deeper on average. This is reflected in 
Figure 6.10 It thus seems that asymmetry regarding the level of economic development 
between countries plays a role in the design of the trade agreement. In comparison, the 
average depth of North–North agreements is notably lower. Developing countries, between 
each other, also seem to prefer shallow agreements that cover on average only 1–2 
                                                 
9 A complete list of WTO+ and WTO-X provisions as classified by Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2010) can 
be found in the Appendix. 
10 The category ‘North’ includes the countries classified by UNCTAD as ‘developed’: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
Dominique Bruhn 
14  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
substantive provisions, focusing on the elimination of tariffs. These findings are in line 
with the stylised facts presented in the World Trade Report 2011 (UNCTAD 2011). Based 
on a sample of roughly 100 PTAs notified to the WTO, the report illustrates that the total 
number of provisions covered is highest for PTAs between developed and developing 
countries. Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2010), however, find a significant amount of ‘legal 
inflation’ in EU agreements, meaning that many policy areas are covered but a large 
number of the provisions are not legally enforceable. 
Figure 6: Average depth by category 
 
 
Source: DESTA database 
A possible explanation for the depth of North–South agreements is the bargaining power 
of developed countries that offer valuable market access in return for concessions 
regarding PTA contents. Manger (2009) further argues that the design of North-South 
agreements reflects developed countries’ aim to gain and secure preferential access to low-
cost production sites in their supply chains by signing PTAs, locking out third-country 
firms and thus ‘investing in protection’ that grants them a competitive advantage.11 
 
Given the discussion in Section 3.1 and the graphic illustrations, the role played by deep 
trade agreements becomes clear. First, they eliminate tariffs between the signing partners – 
removing the magnification effects and repercussions on domestic competitiveness that 
arise in a global value chain context. Second, deep PTAs act as a signalling and 
commitment device that can remedy local institutional deficiencies: “The ‘deep RTA’12  
alters South’s domestic policy environment in a way that makes it safe for North high-tech 
firms to apply their know-how in South” (Baldwin 2013). 
                                                 
11 See Manger (2009) for a more detailed explanation of his argument. 
12 The term ‘preferential trade agreement’ used in this paper encompasses any agreement not concluded at 
the multilateral level which grants preferential treatment to the signing parties, e.g. bilateral and regional 
agreements. Baldwin refers to the same group of agreements but defines them as regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). 
Global value chains and deep preferential trade agreements 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 15 
As global value chains touch on a large range of policy areas, many areas covered in deep 
PTAs may be relevant for global value chain governance and affect the decision of a firm 
to offshore or outsource a certain task to a developing country. The remainder of this 
section will briefly introduce the seven major areas covered by the depth indicator used 
above: (i) elimination of tariffs, (ii) services trade, (iii) investments (plus trade-related 
investment measures), (iv) standards, (v) public procurement, (vi) competition and (vii) 
intellectual property rights. 
(i) Elimination of tariffs 
The elimination of tariffs features not only in deep PTAs, but also in shallow ones, as it is 
the main aspect of trade liberalisation. In principle, the differentiated treatment 
discriminating between members and non-members of the PTA violates the WTO’s most-
favoured-nation (MFN) principle. Article XXIV in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) grants an exception on condition that PTAs liberalise “substantially all 
trade” and aim at trade creation rather than trade diversion. Against this background, 
PTAs provide an opportunity to eliminate tariffs in sensitive areas where the WTO 
members cannot find a consensus on a multilateral level, for example in agri-
culture/fisheries (Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir 2009, Appendix A). However, most countries 
are reluctant to liberalise in PTAs what they aim to protect in multilateral negotiations: 
66% of tariff lines in the ‘sensitive’ sectors with MFN rates above 15 percentage points 
remain at the same level in PTAs (UNCTAD 2011). 
(ii) Services trade 
On the multilateral level, services are regulated in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Services play a significant role in the context of global value chains. 
First, more than 60% of foreign direct investment (FDI) around the globe is allocated to 
services (UNCTAD 2013b). Second, more than 70% of imported services are intermediate 
services (Backer / Miroudot 2013). Third, 40–45% of the value of exports is attributable to 
services, e.g. R&D, design, intermediation, transport and logistics, financial services, etc. 
(Hoekman 2014), making them an essential factor for value creation and value capture 
along the chain. Because of the lack of progress in the WTO, a group of 21 countries, the 
‘really good friends of services’ which account for almost two-thirds of global services 
trade, is pushing forward to liberalise services beyond the WTO’s GATS on a plurilateral 
basis. Of PTAs notified to the WTO, 28% include a services chapter (Mattoo / Sauvé 
2011). Most of them share disciplines on transparency, most-favoured-nation and national 
treatment as well as regulations for monopoly service providers (Mattoo / Sauvé 2011). 
(iii) Investment and trade-related investment measures 
FDI stocks have risen more than six-fold since 1990, clearly outpacing the growth in 
international trade (Hoekman 2014), making the need for an investment framework 
evident. While the WTO covers investment only marginally, thousands of international 
investment agreements have emerged (UNCTAD 2013d). Given the strong linkage of 
trade and investment in global value chains, trade and investment policies should be 
coherent, which suggests bringing the complex system under one roof in the form of deep 
PTAs. As a matter of fact, since the turn of the century we have seen the number of newly 
Dominique Bruhn 
16  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
concluded bilateral investment treaties (BITs) falling while the inclusion of investment 
chapters in PTAs has been gaining momentum (Miroudot 2011).13 Both EU and US 
agreements contain legally enforceable obligations in the investment area (Horn / 
Mavroidis / Sapir 2010). 
Full investment chapters in PTAs contain provisions on market access and establishment, 
non-discrimination, investment regulation and protection, cooperation and promotion of 
investments as well as dispute settlement mechanisms (Miroudot 2011). Such investment 
rules have no equivalent at the multilateral level. 
The WTO touches on the topic of investment in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS) – which are measures that affect foreign investors’ trade 
performance. Two types of trade-related investment measures are prohibited under the 
TRIMS agreement: local content requirements and quantitative export restrictions. Local 
content requirements oblige foreign investors to source a certain proportion of inputs 
domestically. Export restrictions on raw materials, for example, restrict the amount of 
exports. Many PTAs concluded after the Uruguay Round contain TRIMS provisions going 
beyond the WTO regulations (UNCTAD 2013d). An example is the use of export taxes, 
which are not explicitly prohibited under the WTO, as they are not quantitative 
restrictions. However, they do form part of some PTAs: The US has included legally 
enforceable provisions prohibiting export taxes in some trade agreements with the South, 
e.g. US–Chile and US–Morocco (Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir 2009, Appendix A). 
(iv) Standards 
Standards in international trade can be classified broadly into product and process 
standards, which cover regulations in the quality, environmental and social dimensions. 
Product standards relate to the characteristics of the product, while process standards 
regulate the context in which it is produced. In WTO regulations, standards are referred to 
only in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which were negotiated during 
the Uruguay Round to enforce standards related to food safety and health, and technical 
regulations and certification, respectively. However, “the WTO agreements do not force 
countries to adopt standards, but they do provide disciplines to be adopted when applying 
standards” (Maur / Shepherd 2011). PTAs often include more and stronger provisions on 
product and process standards. For example, they put greater emphasis on the im-
plementation and enforcement of standards, sometimes even including dispute settlement 
mechanisms (Maur / Shepherd 2011). Budetta / Piermartini (2009) analyse 70 PTAs, 58 of 
them covering standards. They find that the EU commonly demands harmonisation with 
EU standards, especially in agreements with less-developed countries, which means that 
the trading partner must conform with the given EU standards. Other forms of dealing 
with standards in PTAs include mutual recognition (standards are accepted as different, 
but mutually recognised) and equivalence (standards are considered equivalent). 
                                                 
13 Complementary explanations for the fall in the number of newly signed BITs are (i) the fact that many 
BITs have already been concluded and (ii) there has been a rising number of Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) cases that have revealed the risk associated with BITs. 
Global value chains and deep preferential trade agreements 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 17 
(v) Public procurement 
In the WTO, the only binding agreement on public procurement is the plurilateral Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, which applies a positive list approach.14 This means 
that only a subset of member countries is part of the agreement (plurilateral), but the 40 
signing parties are bound by the thresholds agreed upon in the selected areas of 
procurement (positive list). Out of all PTAs notified to the WTO since 2000, 63% include 
provisions on public procurement – many of them using a negative list approach, 
signalling greater ambition for liberalisation and more restrictive commitments (Dawar / 
Evenett 2011, Figure 17.1). Often these provisions try to establish efficiency and non-
discrimination in public procurement (Dawar / Evenett 2011). Efficiency targets increase 
competition to reduce prices and save costs. An example of non-discrimination is the 
prohibition of local content requirements in public procurement (similar to the TRIMS 
provision above). 
(vi) Competition 
Competition policy aims at preventing anti-competitive behaviour arising from excessive 
market power. Against the background of global value chain trade, and companies 
operating in several markets, jurisdiction and enforcement become more complex, and 
transnational regulatory cooperation regarding competition plays a more important role 
(Dawar / Holmes 2011). So far, the WTO regulates competition issues only implicitly and 
in a non-binding way (Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir 2009, Appendix A). Efforts to build a 
multilateral competition regime have stalled; however, competition provisions repeatedly 
feature in PTAs (Dawar / Holmes 2011). Legally enforceable provisions on competition 
are present in most EU agreements evaluated by Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2009, 
Appendix B), in contrast to US agreements. 
(vii) Intellectual property rights 
Intellectual property protection in the form of patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc. aims at 
encouraging innovation. The exclusive rights granted by intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
serve as a means of offsetting the upfront cost associated with investments in research and 
development (R&D). Global value chains and the associated fragmentation of production 
imply that products with a sizeable R&D content may pass through developing countries 
on their way to the end consumer, for example for assembly purposes. 
Intellectual property rights are regulated in the WTO by means of the TRIPS agreement. 
Nevertheless, many PTAs, notably those concluded by the EU and US with third parties, 
refer to international IP conventions that go beyond the TRIPS obligations (see Horn / 
Mavroidis / Sapir 2009, Appendix B, for a detailed list of international IP conventions 
referred to in EU and US agreements). 
                                                 
14 Positive list approach: the agreement only applies to procurements explicitly listed in the annexes of the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement. Negative list approach: all items are included unless 
explicitly exempted from the agreement. 
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The bottom line of this section is that there is a notable shift from basic multilateral rules 
towards extensive regulations in preferential trade agreements. Antràs / Staiger (2012), 
who conduct a theoretical analysis of the role of trade agreements in the context of 
offshoring15, argue that  
“as the prevalence of offshoring rises, effective trade agreements and the institutions 
that support them will have to evolve, from a market access focus toward a focus on 
deep integration, and from a reliance on simple and broadly-applied rules, such as 
reciprocity and non-discrimination that guide the member-governments in their 
negotiations and shape their agreements, toward a collection of more-individualized 
agreements that can better reflect member-specific idiosyncratic needs.”  
In sum, PTAs are used as a means of underpinning global value chain trade. In the 
following sections this paper will shed more light on their implication for trade flows and 
domestic policy autonomy. 
3.3 Empirical evidence: PTAs, value chain trade and investment 
This section aims to shed light on the impact of PTAs on their members’ trade flows – and 
value chain trade in particular. The literature on the effects of trade agreements on 
international trade flows is vast (see UNCTAD 2011, section C.2, or Baier / Bergstrand 
2007 for a review). Early attempts to empirically identify the effects have struggled to 
draw clear conclusions, owing to methodological challenges such as reverse causality, 
unobserved heterogeneity, multilateral resistance and zeros in the matrix of bilateral trade 
flows. Most noteworthy, Baier / Bergstrand (2007) and Egger et al. (2011) made important 
contributions to the empirical literature by mitigating these problems and advancing to 
identifying causal effects. They found a significant and positive impact of PTAs on 
members’ trade flows. 
However, PTAs have mostly been treated as a ‘black box’: for estimating the effect of a 
PTA on trade, it was common to use a dummy variable taking the value 1 if an agreement 
existed between a country pair and 0 otherwise. This strategy was improved by 
distinguishing the type of trade agreement according to a set of broad categories, e.g. free 
trade agreement, customs union, etc. Just recently, researchers have succeeded in shedding 
further light on the contents of PTAs and their effects on trade: for example, using their 
newly generated database on the design of PTAs, Dür / Baccini / Elsig (2014) find that 
behind-the-border provisions matter for trade flows and that deep agreements thus have a 
much greater effect than shallow ones. 
The recent literature on global value chain trade also considers to a certain extent the 
heterogeneity of PTAs. Orefice / Rocha (2013) find an increase in production network 
trade of almost 12 percentage points when taking into account the depth of the trade 
agreement. They also find that the average impact of deep PTAs has gained relevance over 
time, which could be linked to the growing importance of global value chains. Using the 
number of provisions covered to measure the depth of an agreement, UNCTAD (2011) 
                                                 
15 Offshoring means relocating certain production activities abroad. In this sense, it is similar to the notion 
of production fragmentation within value chains. 
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finds that countries signing deeper agreements trade more than those signing shallow ones. 
More precisely, an additional provision covered in the PTA increases trade in parts and 
components by roughly 2 percentage points on average. 
Noguera (2012) and Johnson / Noguera (2014) estimate a gravity equation for bilateral 
value-added trade flows based on their definition as described in Section 2.1 (VA). They 
find that a PTA increases bilateral gross trade flows more strongly than value-added trade 
flows. This is quite intuitive as the elimination of trade costs encourages multiple border 
crossings and thus makes trade with intermediates more attractive. Multiple border 
crossings, however, are counted only once in the value-added measure, so value-added 
trade is less affected. In numbers, adopting a trade agreement increases gross trade by 23% 
and trade in value added by 15% within the subsequent five years (Noguera 2012). The 
fact that gross trade increases more strongly than value-added trade leads to a decrease in 
the aggregate VAX ratio by 5–10% on average. The decline is larger for deep agreements 
than for shallow ones (Johnson / Noguera 2014). It should be emphasised, however, that a 
PTA leads to increases not only in the exchange of goods, but also in value creation in the 
domestic economy, as reflected by the 15% growth in value-added trade flows.  
A finding specific to trade in the context of global value chains is the impact of trade cost 
with regard to third countries. In cases where goods travel through a third country C, 
exports of value added from country A to country B are also positively affected when A 
signs an agreement with C, and B signs an agreement with C (see Figure 1 for an example 
of tracing value-added exports). “By participating in a global production chain, the 
source country increases value-added trade flows to the destination indirectly by 
increasing integration with other partners that belong to this chain.” This third-country 
effect is larger for deep agreements and has increased over time with the rising 
fragmentation of production (Noguera 2012). 
Given the strong trade-investment nexus inherent in global value chains, the literature on 
the effect of (deep) PTAs on FDI can also give relevant insights. The evidence is generally 
mixed. Recent, more sophisticated studies have improved on the methodology, e.g. by 
describing the extent of investment liberalisation in PTAs more precisely and/or taking 
into account endogeneity issues, leading to more clear-cut, mostly positive results (see, for 
example, Dee / Gali 2005, Lesher / Miroudot 2007, Baltagi / Egger / Pfaffermayr 2008, 
Büthe / Milner 2008, Büge 2011, Medvedev 2012, Büthe / Milner 2014). Berger et al. 
(2013) differentiate between the various types of investment provisions and find a positive 
impact on investment for market access provisions in PTAs, but not in the case of BITs. It 
seems that PTAs that include investment provisions have a stronger impact on foreign 
direct investment than BITs (Lesher / Miroudot (2007).16 A possible explanation is that 
investors are attracted by the whole set of rules offered by PTAs that regulate not only 
investment but also other trade- and investment-related policies. This is in line with the 
                                                 
16 The econometric evidence regarding the effect of BITs on investment is also mixed and may vary with 
the estimation technique used (Yackee 2009; see, for example, Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Aisbett 2007). 
Most recent analyses have resulted in the identification of a significant and positive relationship (Tobin / 
Rose-Ackerman 2011, Busse / Königer / Nunnenkamp 2010, Egger / Merlo 2007, Gallagher / Birch 
2006, Neumayer / Spess 2005, Egger / Pfaffermayr 2004). Findings from surveys, however, suggest that 
foreign investors rarely base their investment decisions on whether or not a BIT has been concluded 
with the respective country (Yackee 2010). 
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argument that PTAs can provide an economic governance framework that is attractive for 
actors in global value chains. 
As a last note, it should be kept in mind that the argument also goes the other way round – 
namely that the extent and type of trade determines the design of PTAs. Referring to 
evidence based on primary data, UNESCAP (2011) argues that in Asia PTAs are not a 
main driving force of production networks, but rather that the emergence of production 
networks due to market initiatives has encouraged and shaped the formation of trade 
agreements in the region. This is in line with the finding by the OECD (2013, 109) that the 
correlation coefficients between the network trade index and PTA index is highest for 
Asia and Oceania, which signed agreements with their main vertical trade partners. 
Orefice / Rocha (2013), Damuri (2012) and UNCTAD (2011) also show that an increase 
in production network trade between member countries leads to a deeper trade agreement. 
This effect is stronger for countries with different income levels. The authors interpret this 
finding as evidence for the need to fill the governance gap arising from the lack of 
appropriate institutions, rules and mechanisms for regulating trade within global value 
chains. In sum, the evidence on the relationship between global value chains and 
preferential trade agreements suggests that causality goes in both directions. “The pattern 
of deep agreements is shaping and is shaped by global value chains” (IMF 2013). 
4 Balancing the trade-offs: policy implications of deep PTAs 
The preceding analysis has shown that the growth in global value chain trade and the 
proliferation of deep preferential trade agreements are highly interconnected. In order to 
allow an assessment of this development, this chapter will introduce the objectives of 
developing countries in the GVC context and investigate the implications of deep PTA 
provisions with regard to these objectives. 
4.1 Developing country objectives in GVCs 
As argued above, the design of deep preferential trade agreements is very likely to 
improve participation in global value chains and increase trade flows for the signing 
parties by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In particular, developing coun-
tries with a weaker domestic regulatory environment can benefit from deep provisions in 
PTAs bolstering insufficient domestic regulations. Nevertheless, deep PTAs also en-
compass risks. 
Objective 1: Participating in global value chains 
While GVC participation is worth striving for, the use of accompanying policies that 
increase value capture at the national level should also be given some thought.  
“The mere participation in GVCs does not a priori imply a positive aspect for 
a country’s economic development prospects. In order for such participation 
to be effective, complementary policies that allow domestic companies to 
climb up the links of the chain may be appropriate, thus making it easier to 
reap the potential benefits from integration into GVCs. In other words, 
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upgrading should allow developing countries to move away from lower value-
added activities, in which competitiveness solely depends on the costs and the 
barriers to entry are low” (Dalle / Fossati / Lavopa 2013). 
Governments in developing countries may thus have an incentive to use behind-the-border 
measures to “maximise value capture at the national level in order to address develop-
mental objectives such as better living standards, higher productivity, the deployment of 
new technologies, increased employment opportunities, and more diversified and resilient 
economies” (Low / Tijaja 2013). GVC participation alone may not contribute sufficiently 
to income generation and could lock developing countries in low value-added segments, 
i.e. induce ‘thin’ industrialisation (UNCTAD 2013c, 177). 
Objective 2: Capturing value in global value chains 
Section 3.1 has stressed the importance of the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
for integration in GVCs. However, “domestic (economic) policies largely determine 
which position countries occupy in GVCs and thus what value they are able to create and 
capture” (OECD 2013, 43). Accordingly, industrial policy and other means of supporting 
domestic development are increasingly on the agenda of policy-makers and the subject of 
an evolving debate (Gereffi / Sturgeon 2013). Ravenhill (2014) criticises the new value 
chain literature for its promotion of trade and investment liberalisation, while neglecting 
the role that industrial policy plays in avoiding the middle-income trap. He argues that 
liberalisation may be sufficient for participation, but insufficient for upgrading in global 
value chains, i.e. moving towards higher value-added tasks. 
Objective 3: Retaining autonomy over domestic policy decisions 
While WTO regulations still leave sufficient room for manoeuvre, preferential trade 
agreements intensify the developmental trade-off between market access and policy space 
(Page 2007, Shadlen 2005a): signing a PTA is likely to reduce the range of policy 
instruments available to developing countries for supporting their development strategies. 
Whether doing so is a good thing from a development perspective is therefore 
controversial. Shadlen (2005a) concludes:  
“To the extent that the regional-bilateral strategy entails the sacrifice of instruments 
that could potentially be used to transform higher levels of trade and investment into 
higher levels of domestic industrial development, the price of more stable and 
preferential market access may be excessive.”  
There is thus a clear trade-off between trade and industrial policy objectives: signing a 
PTA to promote participation in global value chains may come at the cost of domestic 
policy autonomy. Whether participation is enough for capturing value and promoting 
economic development, or whether supportive domestic policy is needed, is not clear a 
priori. A combined objective therefore ought to be the ability to maintain, use and enlarge 
policy space without having to “opt out of international commitments” (Mayer 2009). 
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4.2 The ambivalence of deep PTA provisions 
This section will describe in more detail why developing countries may benefit from 
including certain provisions in their trade agreements, and what repercussions there might 
be with regard to policy space. Resuming the discussion in Section 3.2, each provision is 
assessed with regard to the opportunities and risks involved. 
(i) Elimination of tariffs 
The elimination of tariffs is the most basic objective of trade agreements and thus not new 
to deep PTAs. However, the applied tariffs are generally much lower than the bound 
tariffs agreed upon in the Uruguay Round of the WTO, leaving a degree of uncertainty 
with regard to the future tariff level (Damuri 2012). It is therefore still common to include 
a comprehensive chapter on tariff elimination in PTAs. 
In contrast to the special and differential treatment granted to developing countries in the 
WTO, PTAs are usually based on the principle of reciprocity. In order to get access to 
developed country markets, developing countries also have to reduce their tariffs. This has 
two major potentially negative effects. First, the developing country will no longer have 
the opportunity to keep tariffs high in order to protect infant industries until they become 
competitive enough for the world market. Second, the elimination of tariffs will go hand 
in hand with lost tariff revenue. In many developing countries with a large informal sector 
and a weak tax base, tariffs play a big role in raising government revenue. Although not 
related to policy space, this deprives the government of financial means that could 
potentially be used to promote economic development, e.g. public investments.  
(ii) Services trade 
Services play a major role in global value chain trade, as they constitute a large share of 
value added in the final product. Liberalising services so that they can be efficiently traded 
across borders may boost a further fragmentation of production. Being competitive in 
GVCs implies that all inputs must be sourced at the lowest price. Having cheap access to 
services thanks to low trade barriers thus is a major advantage. Liberalisation of services 
would also provide additional opportunities for developing countries to participate in and 
capture value in GVCs. As a matter of fact, some developing countries have already 
revealed a comparative advantage in services, e.g. India. Nevertheless, they may fear 
opening up their markets because it means exposing domestic service providers to 
international competition. 
(iii) Investment and trade-related investment measures 
Strong investment chapters promise to significantly contribute to GVC participation by 
attracting foreign investors, which can eventually lead not only to higher gross exports but 
also to higher exports in value added. This is especially true when a weak domestic 
regulatory environment leaves investors reluctant to offshore: an investment chapter that 
includes provisions on establishment, non-discrimination and dispute settlement may close 
the regulatory gap that initially scared off the potential investor. 
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The most risky element of an investment chapter is presumably the establishment of an 
investor–state dispute settlement mechanism. This mechanism allows foreign firms to sue 
the state before an international arbitration tribunal if it feels that the provisions covered in 
the agreement have been violated. In 2012, 58 new cases were brought to international 
arbitration, out of which 66% of respondents were developing or transition countries 
(UNCTAD 2013c). While the number of new cases was comparatively high in 2013 (57), 
claims are increasingly also filed against developed countries, bringing the share of 
developing country respondents down to roughly 50% (UNCTAD 2014). ISDS procedures 
are generally useful when investors are expropriated without compensation or not treated 
in a ‘fair and equitable’ way, but the relatively vague definitions leave room for much 
wider interpretation. For example, the tobacco giant Philip Morris is suing Uruguay for 
passing a law on the labelling of cigarette packages (Tienhaara 2011a).17 In such cases, 
development objectives such as the improvement of health may be jeopardised. There is 
even the risk that developing countries refrain from making policies that increase social, 
health or environmental standards in order to avoid being sued (Tienhaara 2011b) – the 
so-called ‘regulatory chill’ – and that developing countries terminate their existing 
investment agreements altogether or refrain from concluding any in the future becuse of 
their fear of ISDS (Poulsen / Aisbett 2013). 
Most developing countries have nevertheless opted for opening up to FDI flows and they 
try to reap the associated benefits. Trade-related investment measures and other 
performance requirements for foreign investors are, however, a very prominent means of 
promoting industrial development (WTO 2002). They may improve the opportunities for 
local firms to engage in GVCs and increase value capture in the domestic economy. For 
example, local content requirements set targets on the amount or share of inputs that have 
to be sourced locally. Local procurement directly generates additional domestic value 
added (UNCTAD 2013d) and further promises indirect long-term effects through 
technological spillovers improving the productivity and value creation of local firms. 
Another performance requirement that can potentially affect trade in value added is export 
restrictions on raw materials, e.g. export taxes. By incentivising the processing of raw 
materials in the domestic economy before they are exported, export restrictions contribute 
to value capture in the local economy and to promoting exports of products at a higher 
value-added segment of the chain. These measures are attractive mostly for countries 
abundant in scarce natural resources that enjoy strong international demand and are thus 
less vulnerable to price changes. 
Although these measures seem suitable at first, using them may result in unintended 
consequences: “In the context of global production networks, these [local content] 
requirements are likely to leave a developing country outside supply chains, as the 
objective of such networks is precisely to fragment the production process and to move 
inputs across countries” (Miroudot 2011). Whether using these measures will increase 
value capture or prevent countries from joining GVCs is an open question and certainly 
depends on the country-specific context. Nevertheless, chapters on investment and TRIMS 
                                                 
17 This is not only a problem in a developing country context. Australia faces the same claim by Philip 
Morris and now has refrained from including investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms in its 
agreements (Tienhaara 2011a). 
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tend to deprive developing countries of the possibility of considering these opportunities 
in the first place. 
(iv) Standards 
One reason for signing PTAs is the increased coordination cost that comes with organising 
international trade in global value chains. Technical and process standards with regard to 
quality, labour and environmental outcomes can bring these costs down (Gereffi / 
Humphrey / Sturgeon 2005). Baldwin / Clark (2000) argue that coordination costs are 
particularly high when, for example, value chains are producing non-standard products. 
Agreeing on common standards upfront can therefore reduce coordination costs and grant 
the signing partners a competitive advantage. 
From a developing country perspective, the standards set in PTAs are typically higher than 
domestic ones, resulting in a gap between the capabilities needed for serving the domestic 
and the export markets (Keesing / Lall 1992). On the basis of data from 700 firms in 17 
developing countries, Maskus / Otsuki / Wilson (2005) estimate that the cost of complying 
with foreign standards equals roughly 5% of a company’s value added. There is also a risk 
that firms in developing countries cannot comply with the standards at all, locking them 
out of international markets (Baldwin 2000). 
If a signing party raises domestic standards unilaterally, there should not be a problem as 
long as countries comply with the minimum standards. However, passing legislation on 
higher social or environmental standards can potentially lead to conflicts with those 
foreign investors who offshored part of the production process precisely because of the 
lower standards and now fear plummeting profits (see paragraph (iii) above). 
(v) Public procurement 
Many PTAs include a public procurement chapter to ensure that public funds are spent in 
an efficient and non-discriminatory way. This is a good thing in general as it makes sure 
that funds are not wasted through inefficient allocation. Nevertheless, in some countries 
‘discriminatory procurement’ is used as a ‘development tool’, because the way in which 
public money is spent can have a notable impact on development (Dawar / Evenett 2011). 
Public procurement policy commonly targets industrial development, e.g. the promotion of 
small and medium enterprises as well as state-owned enterprises (Dawar / Evenett 2011). 
Signing PTAs with a restrictive chapter on public procurement deprives developing 
countries of the opportunity to use this means of supporting industrial development and of 
attempting to increase domestic value capture. However, sourcing inputs efficiently (at the 
private as well as public sector level) is crucial for competitiveness in global value chains. 
Against this background, whether ’buy local’ policies should be applied is quite 
ambiguous and reveals again a trade-off between trade and industrial policy objectives. 
(vi) Competition 
Ensuring a competitive environment is another factor that potentially helps to attract 
foreign investors. For example, Dutz / Vagliasindi (2000) find that “effective enforcement 
of competition policy in transition economies is associated with more rapid entry of new 
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firms”. Developing countries may also benefit from the regulation of competition across 
borders, as they typically suffer the most harm from anti-competitive behaviour on the 
part of large transnational corporations entering their markets (Dawar / Holmes 2011). 
Dawar / Holmes (2011) argue that the benefits from enforcing competition policy by 
fighting anti-competitive practices outweigh the costs of implementation. 
Nevertheless, some developing countries are suspicious of strong competition laws and 
fear the dominance of large foreign firms – as a consequence, they limit competition in 
order to strengthen domestic firms and protect their infant industries (Dawar / Holmes 
2011). While the benefits of such a move are questionable, signing a PTA with a 
competition chapter will generally prohibit any such measures and thus restrict their 
choices of domestic policy instruments. 
(vii) Intellectual property rights 
Intellectual property rights are often perceived as an important determinant of success in 
attracting foreign direct investment. The rationale behind this is that goods with a 
significant content of research and design may cross borders multiple times – also through 
countries with weak IP protection. Including IPRs in PTAs is therefore meant to protect 
investors and grant them a certain extent of market exclusivity in order to encourage 
research and innovation (Fink 2011). However, the empirical evidence on the importance 
of IPRs in investors’ decisions to invest abroad is mixed (Fink 2011). 
Moreover, strong IPRs restrict developing countries in copying and adapting technology-
intensive products. Learning from existing technology and developing their own (imitated) 
products could also help domestic firms to produce at a higher value-added segment of the 
value chain. Including strong IPR chapters in PTAs may therefore only slightly increase 
GVC participation and at the same time prevent countries from developing their own 
products with higher value-added content. Apart from the global value chain context, the 
protection of intellectual property rights plays an important role in public health 
considerations. While this protection provides an important incentive for research in the 
pharmaceutical sector, strong IPRs may reduce developing country access to medicines by 
raising their costs and preventing competition through imitated generic medicines (Brandi / 
Ladenburger / Pegels 2010). 
The establishment of IP rules within the WTO already gave rise to concerns regarding 
policy space in many developing countries (Page 2007), although the TRIPS regulations 
grant some flexibility to developing countries, e.g. compulsory licensing and parallel 
importing18 (Brandi / Ladenburger / Pegels 2010). Shadlen (2005b) examines various 
aspects of IP policy and concludes that trade agreements signed at the bilateral and 
regional level pose an even greater threat to the use of IP policy for development 
                                                 
18 Compulsory licensing: “When the authorities license companies or individuals other than the patent 
owner to use the rights of the patent – to make, use, sell or import a product under patent (i.e. a 
patented product or a product made by a patented process) – without the permission of the patent 
owner.”  
Parallel imports: “When a product made legally (i.e. not pirated) abroad is imported without the 
permission of the intellectual property right-holder (e.g. the trademark or patent owner).” Source: 
WTO Glossary 
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objectives than the WTO TRIPS agreement. For example, PTAs may extend the term for 
patents and limit the flexibilities built into the TRIPS agreement (Brandi / Ladenburger / 
Pegels 2010). 
4.3 Summarising the trade-off 
Including provisions in PTAs which demand deep commitments can be seen as a lock-in 
of domestic policy reform. PTAs are binding contracts and the enforceability of 
commitments makes them a valuable and credible instrument (Hoekman 2011). “From a 
development perspective, the extension of PTAs to regulatory issues can be beneficial if it 
improves policy quality or credibility, thereby reducing risk premiums and helping to 
attract investment” (Hoekman 2011). 
Moreover, as explained above, many of the provisions play a special role in the context of 
global value chains. Any measure distorting competitiveness can eventually backfire and 
severely undermine a country’s participation in global value chains. Regulating 
competition, government procurement, investment, intellectual property rights, etc. in 
such a way that the efficiency criteria are met should ultimately support a country’s efforts 
to be part of a global value chain. From a trade policy perspective, signing deep PTAs 
therefore clearly pays off. A large number of developing countries (e.g. those participating 
in the negotiations of the Transpacific Partnership, Turkey and recently added EU 
members) have acknowledged these benefits and pursue a ‘global integration strategy’ 
involving both unilateral liberalisation and deep PTAs (Hoekman 2014). 
Following a liberal trade policy and signing deep PTAs in order to encourage participation 
in GVCs, however, usually comes at the cost of domestic policy instruments to promote 
industrial development. The paragraphs above have highlighted these trade-offs for each 
of the major provisions. Figure 6 illustrated the fact that, among themselves, developed as 
well as developing countries sign comparatively shallow agreements. As a matter of fact, 
some larger emerging economies such as South Africa, Argentina and Brazil deliberately 
limit their PTA commitments in order to keep using trade policy for import-substitution 
and industrial-promotion objectives (Hoekman 2014). 
In general, the elimination of tariff barriers is easy to implement and has quite predictable 
effects, while concessions regarding non-tariff barriers are more difficult to translate into 
domestic policies, and the associated consequences may not be obvious ex ante. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to measure to what extent preferential trade and investment 
agreements affect national regulations (Claar / Nölke 2013). The ongoing cases in the 
framework of investor–state arbitration (e.g. Uruguay vs. Philip Morris) give anecdotal 
evidence on the conflict between foreign investor and public policy interests. Another 
example is given by Claar / Nölke (2013), who argue that South Africa’s ‘Black Economic 
Empowerment’ policy, which has played an important role in reconciling the population in 
the post-apartheid era, could not be maintained when signing an Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the EU. Cho / Dubash (2003) gather case-study evidence from the 
electricity sector and find as well that investment rules may inhibit the use of policy 
instruments motivated by public policy interests, hence restricting policy space for 
sustainable development. 
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It seems that until the recent past, the trade-off associated with preferential trade and 
investment agreements was not clear to many policy-makers, especially in the case of 
foreign direct investments (Tienhaara 2011a). For example, Poulsen / Aisbett (2013) 
found that many decision-makers in developing countries had not been aware of the far-
reaching contents of international investment agreements (IIAs) until they were sued 
before the investor–state dispute settlement body. 
However, guarding policy space for development has now moved to the top of the 
negotiation agenda of developing countries: Ecuador and Venezuela have already 
terminated their bilateral investment treaties, South Africa recently announced that it will 
not automatically renew BITs and may possibly terminate some as well (Stiglitz 2013). 
The elimination of export taxes is a major stumbling block in the recent negotiations on 
Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and developing countries in Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (Schmieg 2013). Some WTO member countries are even 
pushing for a review of the WTO TRIMS agreement in order to allow for greater policy 
space (UNCTAD 2013d). 
As a last note, even if developing countries succeed in guarding their domestic policy 
instruments, it is far from clear whether they actually achieve the targeted objectives, e.g. 
industrial development (Mayer 2009). Hoekman (2011) argues that industrial policy 
measures involve some negative side effects: they are costly, prolong the adjustment 
period and distort competition. Moreover, although well intended, they are prone to 
missing their objective owing to rent-seeking behaviour or general equilibrium effects.19 
The question raised in this chapter, however, is not whether developing countries should 
apply these measures but whether they have enough room for manoeuvre when they want 
and need to react to individual domestic circumstances in a way that is conducive to 
development. 
5 Policy recommendations 
Policy-makers in developing countries are walking a tightrope when trying to align trade 
and industrial policy objectives in a global value chain context. The preceding analysis has 
served as a basis for drawing conclusions about the role of preferential trade agreements 
for participation and value capture in global value chains from a developing country 
perspective. It also gives valuable insights to policy-makers that are currently faced with 
negotiating trade agreements and finding their role in global value chains. Against the 
background of the preceding chapters, the following policy recommendations with regard 
to PTAs are put forward: 
Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of PTA membership 
Developing countries should carefully weigh the pros and cons associated with 
preferential trade agreements. Section 3.3 presents sufficient empirical evidence to justify 
belief that PTA membership has a positive impact on trade flows within global value 
chains. There is consensus that in addition to tariff elimination, behind-the-border issues 
                                                 
19 Supporting a specific sector acts like a tax on all other sectors. 
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should also be addressed in order to achieve the deep integration needed for GVC 
participation. Developing countries aiming at participating in these chains are therefore 
well advised to reduce trade and transaction costs and improve their competitiveness in 
GVCs by signing a PTA with important partners. However, as argued before, doing so 
may come at the cost of sacrificing policy instruments for supporting domestic industries. 
“How to determine the right balance between maintaining flexibility in national economic 
policy-making and reducing it through multilateral disciplines and collective governance 
remains a contentious issue” (Mayer 2009). Policy-makers should therefore carefully 
assess the costs and benefits of PTA membership. This is a challenging task: it requires 
reliable data (which is often not available), a suitable methodology (e.g. general 
equilibrium modelling) and cooperation across ministries (Fink 2011). Policy-makers are 
advised to investigate the implications of the deep provisions in PTAs and the extent to 
which domestic policy measures would be restricted. As a follow-up, it would be beneficial 
to figure out whether second-best trade and investment policy measures can be replaced by 
less distorting instruments to support domestic development efforts (Hoekman 2011). 
Gear PTAs towards developing country needs 
In order to reap the most benefits from PTA membership, developing countries should try 
to gear the PTA towards their needs. First, the PTA provisions should ensure that foreign 
investors cannot sue the state for aligning domestic policies with changing situations on 
the ground (e.g. reaction to financial crises, implementation of higher standards, etc.). The 
comparative advantage of developing countries’ participation in GVCs to date generally 
stems from low production costs. Naturally, this may change along the path of economic 
development and foreign investors should not be granted the right to sue states for policies 
supporting this development. For example, the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) has established a forum for dispute settlement which excludes disputes over 
health, education, taxation, energy and the environment unless the signed agreement 
explicitly directs these cases to the dispute settlement mechanism, and it requires an 
attempt to make use of available domestic remedies (Tienhaara 2011a). 
Second, developed countries should provide technical assistance (TA) to developing 
countries when signing North–South agreements. TA could serve, for example, to meet 
higher product and process standards as well as establishing and enforcing competition 
policies (Dawar / Holmes 2011). In this case, developing countries would not be left on 
their own with the costs of implementation. 
Build capacities to successfully negotiate PTAs 
Building capacities at the relevant policy level in developing countries is therefore crucial 
for negotiating beneficial PTAs. Hoekman (2011) calls for a new approach to North–
South PTAs “to liberalise and expand market access, to build in policy flexibility, and to 
broaden technical assistance”. Achieving these objectives will not be possible without 
extensive knowledge of the implications of PTA membership (see the first policy 
recommendation above) and negotiation skills. 
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Pursue negotiations at the multilateral level 
Developed and developing countries aiming at participating in GVCs should encourage 
negotiations at the multilateral level. The fact that the rules underpinning global value 
chain trade are made at the bilateral/regional level is not intuitive. Although production 
networks are still stronger at the regional level, the word ‘global’ implies a tendency 
towards more globalisation and increasing interconnectedness of regional blocs (Damuri 
2012). According to Los / Timmer / de Vries (2014), since the turn of the century production 
networks expanded across regional blocs faster than within them, progressively creating a 
‘Factory World’. Noguera (2012) shows that bilateral GVC trade not only increases when two 
parties sign a PTA between each other, but also when they sign agreements with third 
countries through which products travel on the way to the end consumer. 
Against this background, developed and developing countries should pursue multilateral 
negotiations. First, this step can grant access to potentially more value chains since the 
agreement applies not only to the preferential partners. Second, developing countries may 
strengthen their bargaining power with respect to policy flexibility in deep provisions 
when they take a common stance at the multilateral level. This strategy should defuse the 
strong trade-off between trade and industrial policy objectives, and between GVC 
participation and industrial policies for value capture, encountered in deep PTAs. 
Taking a global value chain perspective at the multilateral level may even revive the 
sluggish negotiations at the WTO. Hoekman (2014) supports this supply chain approach 
as opposed to the ‘silo approach’ in the WTO which addresses each policy area in 
isolation:  
“The idea is not that negotiations should focus on specific value chains, but that a 
supply chain framework can help identify how an overall package can be constructed 
that spans the different policy areas that are on the table, including not just tariffs but 
also services policies that affect the operation of supply chains.”  
Given the importance of GVC trade, this approach accounts for the strong nexus of 
different policy areas and may help to align the heterogeneous country interests. 
6 Suggestions for further research 
While some policy recommendations can already be drawn from the preceding analysis, 
there is much scope for further research tackling the questions at the interface of global 
value chains, trade, investment and industrial policy. Partly thanks to the availability of 
new, insightful data, both the literature on global value chains and that on preferential 
trade agreements have gained momentum. The work on decomposing international trade 
flows into their value-added components as well as that on the detailed coding of trade and 
investment agreements provides a good basis for sophisticated empirical analysis. Future 
research should therefore make use of the newly available information and shed further 
light on global value chains and preferential trade agreements – and in particular on their 
interaction. 
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Concerning value-added trade, the field of research is expanding dynamically. However, 
so far the focus has been on the methodology and accounting frameworks in order to 
produce meaningful indicators for value-added trade, and few researchers have gone 
beyond descriptive statistics. Now, the frameworks and data seem mature and reliable 
enough to be put it into practice and used for more sophisticated econometric analysis. 
Many developing countries have successfully used the opportunity to integrate into the 
international trading system by participating in global value chains, especially in East and 
South East Asia. Other countries are left behind or only contribute via low value-added 
segments of the chain, leaving their exports of value added insignificant. Descriptive 
statistics and several country studies have shed some light on these issues, but for a more 
general understanding of the determinants of GVC participation and value capture – and 
the particular role of trade policy in this regard – a broader cross-country analysis is 
lacking. 
With regard to PTAs, it has been shown that they increase gross trade, intermediate goods 
trade and (to a lesser extent) trade in value added (see, e.g., Orefice / Rocha 2013, Noguera 
2012, Johnson / Noguera 2014). Although existing studies give a broad account of the depth 
of PTAs, they are still very much treated as a ’black box’. Following recent empirical work 
that considers key provisions in trade and investment agreements (e.g. Dür / Baccini / Elsig 
2014, Berger et al. 2013), there is a need to assess what role the design of PTAs can play in 
helping countries increase their value-added exports. Moreover, the value-added trade 
literature has so far focused on the 40 countries covered in the Word Input-Output Database, 
which is strongly biased towards European and other OECD countries. Extending the 
analysis to developing countries is crucial for understanding if and how they can benefit 
from signing PTAs. 
Moreover, there is a need to better understand the implications that PTAs have for policy 
space in a global value chain context. While PTAs are undoubtedly an important means of 
participating in GVCs and promoting the exchange of goods, benefiting from this 
participation in terms of upgrading, i.e. moving to higher value-added tasks, may require 
complementary policies that are often restricted in deep PTA provisions. The arising 
tension between these objectives is quite intuitive but lacks strong empirical evidence. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has explained in detail the implications of preferential trade agreements in a 
global value chain context. As GVCs imply a strong connection between trade and 
investment issues, not only traditional trade barriers but also behind-the-border policies 
have a great impact on whether countries participate in global value chains and how much 
value they capture. The deep PTAs that have emerged in the last decades not only 
eliminate tariffs, but cover a great deal of other policy areas providing an economic 
governance framework that complements local institutions. In that sense, their role for 
integration into international production networks cannot be overemphasised. 
Developing countries may nevertheless face a trade-off between these benefits from deep 
economic integration and the associated restrictions on their policy autonomy which 
prevents them from making use of complementary policies intended to promote industrial 
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development and upgrading in GVCs. By addressing the trade-offs between trade and 
industrial policy objectives in a global value chain context, this paper acknowledges the 
negative repercussions of trade barriers in GVCs as well as the need for developing 
countries to accompany GVC participation with domestic policies. By doing so, it picks 
up the critique of Ravenhill (2014) and Dalle / Fossati / Lavopa (2013) on the ‘new’ GVC 
literature which almost exclusively argues for further liberalisation. 
On the basis of the analysis of GVCs and deep PTAs, this paper has derived policy 
recommendations for developing countries and identified gaps in the literature that need to 
be addressed to better inform policy-makers in shaping their GVC policies. 
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Table 1: Country Coverage by income category 
High income (47) Aruba, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hong 
Kong (China), Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Malta, Netherlands, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay 
Upper middle 
income (26) 
Algeria, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Gabon, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, 
Macedonia (TFYR), Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Peru, Romania, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela 
Lower middle 
income (23) 
Armenia, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guyana, India, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam 
Low income (9) Bangladesh, Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo 
Source: The World Bank, 2014 
 
 
 
Table 2: WTO+ and WTO-X areas 
WTO+ FTA Industrial, FTA Agriculture, Customs, Export Taxes, SPS, TBT, STE, 
Antidumping, Counterveiling Measures, State Aid, Public Procurement, 
TRIMs, GATS, TRIPs 
WTO-X Anti-Corruption, Competition Policy, Environmental Laws, IPR, Investment, 
Labour Market Regulation, Movement of Capital, Consumer Protection, Data 
Protection, Agriculture, Approximation of Legislation, Audio Visual, Civil 
Protection, Innovation Policies, Cultural Cooperation, Economic Policy 
Dialogue, Education and Training, Energy, Financial Assistance, Health, 
Human Rights, Illegal Immigration, Illicit Drug, Industrial Cooperation, 
Information Society, Mining, Money Laundering, Nuclear Safety, Political 
Dialogue, Public Administration, Regional Cooperation, Research and 
Technology, SME, Social Matters, Statistics, Taxation, Terrorism, Visa and 
Asylum 
Source: Horn / Mavroidis / Sapir (2010) 
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